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Prior to 1960, divorce law reflected the idea that the state had, "a profound
interest in the institution [of marriage], and therefore could closely regulate its
formation, organization, and dissolution."' As a result, a party seeking divorce
had to demonstrate that his or her spouse was guilty of marital fault.2 Initially,
fault grounds were limited to transgressions such as adultery, physical or
mental cruelty, and desertion.3 In the early 1900s, however, many states
expanded their fault statutes to include grounds such as convictions for certain
crimes, homosexuality, insanity, and drug or alcohol addiction.4
In the early 1960s, as society began to view marriage as a partnership,
rather than as a contract between individuals, the fault-based regime began to
deteriorate.5 This movement was supported by the fact that couples would
often forum shop for more lenient jurisdictions, or simply manufacture evi-
dence of fault to obtain divorces.6 The women's liberation movement, and the
developing notion of the family as a tightly knit group of independent individu-
als, furthered the trend.' Finally, in 1970, California became the first state to
enact a no-fault law, removing marital fault as a consideration in the grounds
for divorce.8
While all fifty states eventually enacted no-fault statutes relating to the
grounds for divorce,9 only a handful of jurisdictions included provisions pre-
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1 Laura Bradford, The Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent Proposals to Reform No-
Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REv. 607, 609 (1997).
2 See id. at 610.
3 See id.
4 See id.
' See id. at 611.
6 See id.
7 See Jane Biondi, Who Pays for Guilt?: Recent Fault-Based Divorce Reform Proposals,
Cultural Stereotypes and Economic Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REv. 611, 613 (1999).
8 See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 291 (1987).
9 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 614. Fifteen jurisdictions have enacted strict no-fault laws,
which abolish fault-based grounds entirely and rely on marital breakdown as the basis for
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cluding the consideration of fault in determining property distribution or ali-
mony.1° Where no express reference has been made, courts differ as to
whether to take fault into account.'" Some courts have held that, in the absence
of an express provision, fault may be considered. 2 On the other hand, some
courts have concluded that the respective legislatures could not have intended
for fault to remain a factor after it was eliminated from the dissolution stat-
utes.13 This debate has recently been revived with the widespread eradication
of interspousal tort immunity, the increasing need for legal remedies to abused
spouses, and the volumes of domestic relations scholarship that favor a legal
vindication of moral values. 14
This Note will use the recent Nevada Supreme Court decision in Rodri-
guez v. Rodriguez"' to illustrate the importance of eliminating fault from con-
sideration, especially in the context of alimony awards. First, this Note will
outline the facts and holding in Rodriguez. Second, this Note will discuss the
history and development of property division and alimony statutes, and the role
of fault in these statutes. Third, this Note will evaluate the property allocation
and alimony statutes in Nevada's fellow community property states, including
those that remain on the opposite end of the spectrum with regard to the consid-
eration of fault. Finally, this Note will evaluate several proposals for less dis-
cretionary, more uniform alimony laws, and present another alternative.
divorce. See id. Twenty-one states have simply added no-fault provisions to their existing
fault-based statutes. See id. Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have merged fault
grounds with no-fault provisions, thus creating grounds for divorce such as voluntary separa-
tion or incompatibility. See id.
10 See Kristine Cordier Kamezis, J.D., Annotation, Fault as Consideration in Alimony,
Spousal Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d
116, 119-20.
" See id.
12 See, e.g., Huggins v. Huggins, 331 So. 2d 704 (Ala. 1976) (reading fault into alimony
statute regardless of grounds for divorce); Peterson v. Peterson, 242 N.W.2d 103 (Minn.
1976) (noting that no-fault grounds are limited to divorce and do not extend to property or
alimony); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975) (stating that no-fault grounds for
divorce are not controlling on the issue of alimony); Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.
App. 1977) (finding no provision regarding the role of fault in property division that corre-
sponded with the no-fault grounds for ending the marriage).
13 See, e.g., Heilman v. Heilman, 610 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to
consider adultery as a factor in awarding alimony); Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d 272
(Ga. 1976) (reasoning that since no-fault grounds precluded a finding that fault caused the
breakdown of the marriage, evidence on the fault of a spouse would also be irrelevant on the
issue of alimony); Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (eliminating "guilty
party" concept from alimony determinations to satisfy the legislature's intent); Campbell v.
Campbell, 276 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1979) (holding that the issue of whether one party was
responsible for the breakdown of the marriage was not a proper factor for the court to con-
sider when dividing property).
14 See generally Carl E. Schneider, Moral Disclosure and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Mari-
tal Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 BYU L. REV. 197 (1991); Ira Mark Ellman, The
Place of Fault in Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773 (1996); Jane C. Murphy,
Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Fam-
ily Law, 60 U. PITr. L. REV. 1111 (1999).
"5 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).
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II. RODRIGUEZ V. RODRIGUEZ
Rodriguez presented the Nevada Supreme Court with an appeal from the
trial court's decision to deny an award of alimony based on marital miscon-
duct.6 Antonio Rodriguez filed for divorce from his wife of twenty-one years
in September 1994.17 When the trial began in January 1996, Antonio earned a
salary of $75,000.00 per year, while his wife Glenda earned $14,000.00.'8
Despite the duration of the marriage, and the disparity in income, the trial court
refused Glenda's request for maintenance because she engaged in an extra-
marital affair, and "initiated the parties' separation by leaving the family to
pursue the extra-marital relationship."'1 9
The trial court based its decision on the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling in
Heim v. Heim,20 where the court's dictum suggested that marital misconduct
may be considered in determining a maintenance award.2 1 When Heim was
decided, the Nevada dissolution statute instructed that a court might award ali-
mony and community property, "having regard to the respective merits of the
",22parties. The Heim court construed this to mean that courts could divide
property and award alimony in a just and equitable manner, and suggested that
"[w]hen examining the 'merits' of the parties the courts might look at the par-
ties' good actions or good behavior or lack thereof in determining what either
husband or wife justly deserves."23
The trial court's reliance on Heim caused it to ignore the amendments
made to section 125.150 of the Nevada Revised Statutes in 1993. The Nevada
legislature, recognizing the conflict between the concept of no-fault divorce,
and the consideration of fault in alimony awards and property division, deleted
the phrase "having regard to the respective merits of the parties" from the stat-
ute.24 In 1997, the Nevada Supreme Court reviewed the statute with regard to
property division, concluding that the 1993 amendment reflected the Nevada
legislature's desire to safeguard the concept of no-fault divorce. 25 Conse-
quently, marital misconduct is not considered in the disposition of community
16 See id.
17 See id. at 415-16.
18 See id. at 416. Glenda Rodriguez worked as a hall monitor for the Clark County School
District and earned $10.11 per hour, during the nine-month school year. See id.
19 Id.
20 763 P.2d 678 (Nev. 1988).
21 See Rodriguez, 13 P.3d at 416.
22 NEV. REV. STAT. 125.150(1) (1988).
23 Heim, 763 P.2d at 681.
24 NEV. REV. STAT. 125.150(1) (1991). The statute now reads as follows:
In granting a divorce, the court:
(a) May award such alimony to the wife or to the husband, in a specified principle sum or as
specified by periodic payments, as appears just and equitable; and
(b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the
parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the community property in
such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a compelling reason to do so and sets forth
in writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition.
25 See Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 946 P.2d 200, 203 (Nev. 1997).
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property.2 6 The court carved out an exception, however, to allow consideration
of the economic consequences associated with the misconduct.27
The Rodriguez case was the Nevada Supreme Court's first opportunity to
review the amended statute with respect to alimony awards. 28 The court reiter-
ated the legislative intent behind the 1993 amendment, stating that the question-
able language was omitted in response to judicial decisions suggesting that
fault might be a determining factor in alimony and property distribution.2 9
Because the legislature specified that there are different considerations for
property distribution and alimony, the court chose not to apply the economic
consequence exception to maintenance awards.3 ° Instead, the court referred to
Buchanan v. Buchanan,3 1 where "an inexhaustive list of. . . common sense
considerations" was provided by the court.32 These considerations, commonly
referred to as the "Buchanan factors," include:
[t]he financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of their respective prop-
erty; the contribution of each party to any property held by them as tenants by the
entirety; the duration of the marriage; the husband's income, his earning capacity, his
age, health and ability to labor; and the wife's age, health, station and ability to earn a
living.
33
While acknowledging the archaic language, in addition to the unnecessary
distinctions between husband and wife, the Rodriguez court concluded that the
Buchanan factors are the appropriate guidelines for determining an alimony
award.34 And, although other factors may be considered, depending on the
facts of each case,35 the court declared that the trial court should not consider
fault or marital misconduct when evaluating the just and equitable principles
dictated by the statute.36 Consequently, the trial court's denial of Glenda Rod-
riguez's request for spousal maintenance was reversed, and the case was
remanded back to the trial court to determine an alimony award in accordance




28 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415 (Nev. 2000).
29 Id. at 417.
30 Id. at 418.
31 523 P.2d 1 (Nev. 1974).
32 See Heim v. Heim, 763 P.2d 678, 680 (Nev. 1988).
33 Buchanan, 523 P.2d at 5.
14 See Rodriguez, 13 P.3d at 419.
35 See id. at 419 n.5. The court suggested that other considerations might include education,
training, or marketable skills possessed by a spouse. See id.
36 See id. at 420.
37 See id. The Nevada Supreme Court recognized that, under the Buchanan guidelines,
Glenda was entitled to maintenance. See id. "Glenda, a middle-aged woman with health
problems, was forced to survive on a meager income after enjoying a comfortable lifestyle




III. THE ROLE OF FAULT IN PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
AND ALIMONY AWARD
Property distribution and alimony (or spousal maintenance) are the two
mechanisms used to resolve the inequities between spouses at the time of
divorce.38 They are distinguishable in that property claims involve assets
acquired during the marriage, while maintenance involves post-divorce
income." Each of the fifty states has enacted no-fault divorce statutes, and at
least half have adopted portions of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,
which continues to allow consideration of fault in both property division and
alimony.4 °
A. Fault in Property Division
It seems unnecessary to use fault as a determinative factor in property
distribution, especially since property division recognizes the parties' contribu-
tions to the marriage, rather than what they have done to cause its deteriora-
tion.4" Nevertheless, some equitable distribution states expressly consider fault
when distributing marital property,4 2 while others expressly disregard the
issue.4 3 A no-fault rule seems to be developing, however, based on the concept
of joint ownership." This theory makes property claims legal, rather than
equitable, and results in the division of property between two owners, thus
making the fault of the parties largely irrelevant.4 5
B. Fault in Alimony
Alimony statutes have no underlying theory that is similar to the joint
ownership view in the property regime.46 Alimony originated as a punishment
for guilty conduct on the part of one spouse, and a reward for innocent conduct
on the part of the other.47 As the trend in divorce law moved away from fault
and punishment, and toward individual independence and reduced animosity
between the parties, the role of alimony became based on need and ability to
38 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse (with comments by Katharine T. Bartlett), Symposium
on Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory: Sex, Lies, and Dissipation: The Discourse of Fault
in a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2532 (1994).
39 See id.
4 See id.
41 See id. at 2533.
42 See Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773,
824-30 (1996). These states include Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming.
43 See id. at 810-18. A majority of states follow this approach. They include Alaska, Ari-
zona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See id.
44 See id. at 783.
41 See id. In community property states, the joint ownership view would imply that commu-
nity property principles would apply "to the management of assets during the marriage, and
to their distribution after a spouse's death." Id. The common law states have yet to venture
that far. See id.
46 See id.
47 See Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 2535-36.
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pay.48 As such, maintenance claims remain discretionary in entitlement, as
well as amount, and fault is often included in the lists of factors that courts may
consider.49
C. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), first introduced in
1970, blurs the line between property division and alimony with the suggestion
that judges should use property to accommodate economic need.50 The UMDA
provides an extensive list of factors to guide judges in distributing marital prop-
erty, including the duration of the marriage, the age, health, and occupation of
each party, vocational skills and employability, prior marriages, and custodial
provisions.5" Further, the UMDA instructs judges to consider whether the
property is being apportioned in addition to, or in lieu of alimony, indicating
not only that property is intended to serve a support function, but that a prefer-
ence exists for property allocation over alimony. 2 This preference is
expressed in the provision stating that maintenance should not be awarded
unless, "the spouse seeking maintenance ... lacks sufficient property to pro-
vide for his reasonable needs."53
The UMDA does not promote the consideration of fault in either property
division or maintenance awards.54 In fact, it specifically provides that such
determinations be made "without regard to marital misconduct. '55 The UMDA
has been implemented, at least in part, by approximately half of the states, yet
jurisdictions remain divided as to whether fault should play a role in property
and alimony decisions.56 This dilemma is further complicated by the fact that,
even in no-fault jurisdictions, marital misconduct can affect these determina-
tions in two ways.57 First, nearly all states recognize what are referred to as
"financial cost" exceptions to no-fault statutes. 58 This exception allows judges
to consider misconduct that has directly affected the amount of property availa-
ble for distribution.59 Second, marital misconduct potentially affects property
and alimony decisions by increasing the economic need of one party.60 The
classic example is domestic violence, which often leaves a party with increased
costs, and fewer financial resources. 61
48 See id. at 2536.
49 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 784.
50 See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship Between Property Division and Alimony: The
Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 827, 830-32 (1988).
51 See id. at 839.
52 See id. at 839-40.
13 Id. at 840-41 (quoting UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 308 cmt. 9A U.L.A. 348
(1973)).
54 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 776.




59 See id. at 776-77.
6 See id. at 777.
61 See id. at 777 n.10.
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These theories were exemplified in Rodriguez, when the court recognized
that repeated acts of physical or mental abuse create expenses and decrease
chances of employment.6 2 The court concluded that misconduct of this sort
could result in an unequal distribution of property.63 Moreover, the court,
when applying the Buchanan factors to determine alimony, could consider the
physical and mental condition of the abused spouse with regard to his or her
financial condition, health, and employability.64 This type of analysis is per-
mitted in no-fault states because the primary basis for an award of alimony is a
disparity in post-divorce living standards. 65 Therefore, the judges "can respond
without explicit consideration of the misconduct that has altered the
disparity. ' 6 6
IV. FAULT AND ALIMONY IN OTHER COMMUNITY PROPERTY JURISDICTIONS
The Rodriguez decision solidifies Nevada's position as one of the twenty
states67 that forbids the consideration of fault in both property distribution and
alimony awards.6 8 In addition, Nevada is one of five community property
states with such a scheme. 69 Eliminating marital misconduct from alimony
statutes makes sense in light of the policy underlying the principle of commu-
nity property. Community property laws presume joint ownership of assets,
existing from the time the marriage begins.7 ° This format recognizes the phi-
losophy that a marriage consists of two individuals that, together, create a part-
nership.71 As such, when property is divided at dissolution, using a fifty-fifty
starting point, the discretion of the court is greatly limited.7 2 An unequal divi-
sion of property is only permitted when the court finds and articulates a com-
pelling reason.7 3 Similarly, Nevada's statutory construction, combined with
the judiciary's interpretation, has successfully limited the factors considered by
dissolution courts with regard to alimony. After Rodriguez, courts must refrain
from considering fault or misconduct, and must decide whether to award main-
tenance based on the parameters set forth in Buchanan.
62 See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415, 419 (Nev. 2000).
63 See id.
I See id.
65 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 777.
66 Id.
67 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 810-15. The remaining spelling states are: Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See id.
68 See id. at 813. Prior to Rodriguez, there were no modem Nevada cases addressing the
role of fault in alimony, and prior Nevada Supreme Court decisions (such as Heim) indicated
that an evaluation of marital misconduct might be permissible. See id.
69 See id. at 810-15. The remaining states are Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Wash-
ington. See id.
70 See GRACE GANZ BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (3d ed. 1999).
71 See Kay, supra note 9, at 302.
72 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 783.
73 See NEV. REv. STAT. 125.150(1)(b) (2000).
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A. Jurisdictions with No-Fault Alimony Statutes
A survey of other community property jurisdictions reveals that many
have adopted an approach to alimony similar to that in Nevada. These states
include Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Washington.
1. Arizona
Arizona's property allocation statute incorporates language from the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, instructing that a court must distribute marital
property "without regard to marital misconduct."74 The state's maintenance
law reads similarly. 5 Interestingly, the statute also reflects the UMDA's pref-
erence for property distribution, with marital property allocated to each party
listed as one of the many factors to be considered by the court. 6
2. California
In California, an equal division property regime completely eliminates
judicial discretion when allocating marital property. In fact, the code provides
that in any "pleading or proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separa-
tion . . . including depositions and discovery . . . evidence of specific acts of
misconduct is improper and inadmissible."" Accordingly, courts are also pro-
hibited from considering fault in alimony awards.78
As the first no-fault divorce statute in the nation, California's Family Law
Act of 1970 sparked the development of no-fault laws in other jurisdictions,
and worked to reform state statutes in other areas of family law. 79 Perhaps the
most significant change was the requirement that property be divided equally
between the parties at the time of divorce.80 Although the Act's drafters did
not intend to do so, this provision promoted gender equality in dissolution law
by treating spouses as equal partners without regard to sex. 8 ' The equality
theme also resulted in the legislative expansion of the factors to be taken into
account when awarding alimony. 82 The Act initially stated two factors, and
that number has now increased to eight.83 In addition, the code allows judges
to make factual findings with respect to each factor.84
3. New Mexico
New Mexico's dissolution statutes are silent as to the use of fault, since
fault is not included in the list of factors for a court to consider in making a
determination with regard to property or alimony.85 Further, there are no deci-
7' ARiz. REv. STAT. § 25-318 (2000).
75 See id. § 25-319(B) (2000).
76 See id. § 25-319(B)(9).
SCAL. FAM. CODE § 2335 (West 1995). See also Ellman, supra note 42, at 810.
78 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 810-15.
79 See Kay, supra note 8, at 297.
80 See id. at 301.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 306-07.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 307.
85 See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(E) (Michie 1999).
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sions addressing fault as a factor in divorce proceedings. The case that comes
closest indicates that the state is "not concerned with 'fault' of the spouse in
determining a right to support .... An award of alimony is not dependant
upon the fault of a spouse. '"86
4. Washington
Like Arizona, Washington follows the UMDA, requiring that property and
alimony decisions be made "without regard to marital misconduct."87 How-
ever, the legislature does allow the physical and emotional condition of the
spouse seeking support to be a factor for the court, along with that party's
financial obligations. 88 As such, circumstances that traditionally indicate fault,
such as spousal abuse, can be considered to the extent that they diminish the
party's ability to adequately function in these areas. In re Foran89 reflects this
philosophy. There, the court admitted evidence of physical abuse during the
marriage to decide the wife's employability and future earning capacity based
on post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from the abuse.9"
B. Jurisdictions with Fault-Based Alimony Statutes
Despite the majority of community property states that have consistent no-
fault provisions for property distribution and alimony, three jurisdictions con-
tinue to allow consideration of marital misconduct. Application of the Rodri-
guez facts to their respective statutes reveals the vast disparity between the no-
fault and fault based approaches.
1. Idaho
The Idaho Code does not provide for the consideration of fault in property
allocation, 9' yet it allows fault to be a factor in alimony decisions.92 Prior to
1990, innocence was the threshold requirement to establish eligibility for ali-
mony. 93 In at least one instance, however, the court upheld a maintenance
award when the wife's fault, while enough to grant divorce on the husband's
behalf, was not so significant to justify a denial of alimony. 94 Amendments to
the statute in 1990 eliminated fault as a prerequisite, relegating it to one of
several factors for the court's consideration.95 In its place, need and ability to
pay became the primary basis for alimony awards.96 There are few relevant
86 Ellman, supra note 42, at 814 (quoting Lauderdale v. Hyord Conduit Corp., 555 P.2d
700, 705 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)).
87 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.09.080, 26.09.090 (West 1999).
88 See id. § 26.09.080(1)(e).
89 834 P.2d 1081 (Wash. App. 1992).
90 See id. at 1083.
9' See IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1)(b) (Michie 2000) (instructing that the court divide commu-
nity property "substantially equally").
92 See id. § 32-705(2)(g).
93 See Marmon v. Marmon, 825 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); Tisdale v. Tisdale,
900 P.2d 807, 810 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995).
9' See Shepard v. Shepard, 497 P.2d 321 (Idaho 1972).
91 See Tisdale, 900 P.2d at 810.
96 See Marnon, 825 P.2d at 1139.
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cases following the amendment but it seems as though Idaho courts have let
fault fall by the wayside.97
2. Louisiana
Louisiana is classified as a "pure" no-fault property state.9" As such, the
state does not consider fault, or any other factor, in allocating property to
divorcing spouses. Rather, it makes an equal division of the community prop-
erty.99 It would seem to follow that fault would be eliminated from considera-
tion in maintenance decisions as well, but the Louisiana Civil Code provides
for a fault-based determination in cases of final alimony awards.1°° An award
of interim periodic spousal support, on the other hand, does not require a find-
ing of fault.'' The Louisiana Supreme Court, after noting that several
attempts to eliminate fault from the statute failed in the legislature, 0 2 defined
fault as "serious misconduct, which is a cause of the marriage's dissolution."' 03
Transgressions included in this definition are adultery, felony convictions, cruel
treatment, public defamation, abandonment, attempted murder, and intentional
failure to support."
3. Texas
Although a no-fault divorce statute was adopted in 1970, Texas law allows
litigants to plead fault based on traditional grounds such as mental cruelty,
adultery, or abandonment. 10 5 The law provides for the consideration of fault in
both property division and alimony awards, regardless of whether the divorce
was granted under the fault provision, on a no-fault basis, or according to both
fault and no-fault grounds. 0 6 The relevant property statute provides that com-
munity property be divided as is "deem[ed] just and right."'0 7 Fault may be
considered in the property distribution to make a just division, but not to punish
a spouse.'0 8 While the court never distinguished between the two, it did go on
to state that the trial court has extremely broad discretion in these instances. 9
97 See, e.g., Mulch v. Mulch, 867 P.2d 967, 973 (Idaho 1994) (citing to amended statute to
award an abused wife alimony, and stating that if the innocent spouse requirement applied,
wife would also be entitled because any behavior that may have provoked her husband was
part of the abuse cycle that he created).
98 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 821.
99 See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 112(A) (1) (West 1996).
100 See id. at art. Ill (stating that the court may "award final periodic support to a party free
from fault .... ).
'o' See id. at art. 113.
102 See Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359, 362 nn. 2-3 (La. 1995).
103 Id. at 362.
" See Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So. 2d 826, 829 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
105 See Barbara Ann Kazen, Division of Property at the Time of Divorce, 49 BAYLOR L.
REv. 417, 426 (1997).
106 See id.
107 TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 2000),




Texas is unique among the fifty states when it comes to alimony because
the state's alimony statute was enacted in 1995,110 nearly 150 years after most
other jurisdictions."'1 The hesitancy to enact an alimony law stemmed from
the fact that, since 1841, alimony had been contrary to public policy in
Texas. 112 In that year, the Texas Supreme Court evaluated the state's second
divorce statute, which called for permanent divorce, and alimony pending
divorce. 113 The statute neglected to provide for alimony after divorce, and the
courts therefore reasoned that what was not expressly stated was prohibited.114
Today, alimony in Texas is awarded on a limited basis. Claimants must have
been married for at least ten years, except in cases of family violence.1 15 In
addition, the maintenance is always temporary, with no award lasting longer
than three years.' 16 Finally, in determining the duration and size of the award,
a court must consider all relevant factors, including "the marital misconduct of
the spouse seeking maintenance."
'1 17
C. Application of the Rodriguez Facts to Fault Based Statutes
Application of the Rodriguez facts to the aforementioned statutory
schemes reveals the inconsistent results yielded by the varied divorce statutes
throughout the United States. Had the Rodriguez divorce been in Idaho, for
example, there is some debate as to whether Glenda would be entitled to ali-
mony. Prior to the 1990 statutory amendments, she would be denied support
because she was not an innocent spouse. Now that the statute reflects the legis-
lature's desire to make need and ability to pay the primary concerns,' 1 8 it
appears that Glenda has a greater opportunity to receive support. Nevertheless,
Idaho has not entirely eliminated fault from the alimony provision; it is still a
factor for the court to consider.' 19 And since Glenda's affair led to her aban-
donment of the marital home, 2 ° an Idaho court could very well deny her
request, despite her economic need.
Under the Louisiana statute, Glenda's request would be flatly denied
because her affair would render her at fault. In Louisiana, only innocent
spouses can request alimony. 121 In fact, since Louisiana courts define adultery
as the type of serious misconduct that entitles an innocent spouse to a mainte-
110 See Denise Causey Haugen, Texas and Alimony: The Possibility of a Constitutional
Attack, 34 Hous. L. REV. 477, 492 (1997). In efforts to align it with the other forty-nine
states, the Texas legislature introduced alimony bills in every session since 1971. See id.
Until 1995, they were all defeated. See id.
"I See James W. Paulsen, Symposium Remark: The History of Alimony in Texas and the
New "Spousal Maintenance" Statute, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151 (1998).
112 See id.
113 See id. at 152.
114 See id.
115 See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 8.002 (Vernon 2000).
116 See id. §8.005(a)(1).
117 Id. § 8.003.
118 See IDAHO CODE § 32-705(1) (Michie 2000).
119 See id. § 32-705(2)(g).
120 See Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 13 P.3d 415, 416 (Nev. 2000) (stating that the trial court
denied Glenda's request for support because she participated in an extra-marital affair and
left the family home).
121 See LA. Civ. CODE Art. 111 (West 2000).
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nance award, 122 a Louisiana judge could feasibly force Glenda to pay support
for her husband. The only way Glenda could receive support under this statute
is on a temporary basis. The facts of the case indicate that this would not prove
beneficial because of Glenda's minimal earning capacity, and her ailing
health. 123
Glenda's request would also be denied were this case tried in Texas.
Although Texas' alimony statute is relatively new, it is very restricted. While
the Rodriguez marriage meets the threshold duration of ten years,124 the fault of
the spouse seeking maintenance is a factor for courts to consider,1 25 and as
such, Glenda's case would fail. Even if the court were to award alimony to
Glenda, Texas' requirement that support payments last no longer than three
years does not allow for the financial support that a woman with a low earning
capacity and poor health needs to sustain her for the remainder of her life.
V. PROPOSALS FOR A MORE UNIFORM APPROACH TO
MAINTENANCE AWARDS
While the trend in most jurisdictions is to eliminate marital fault from
consideration in property allocation, the alimony statutes reflect a patchwork of
different policies. 12 6 Legislative reform in this area is becoming increasingly
important, and some have suggested that the best solution is the reinstitution of
fault-based dissolution laws.' 27 These efforts are supported by the fundamental
belief that fault-based statutes will preserve the family unit.
12 8
A. Fault v. No-Fault: The Age Old Debate
Many states have attempted to reform their divorce laws by reintroducing
the notion of fault.12 9 Louisiana's legislature introduced fault into that state's
divorce laws by adopting the Covenant Marriage Act in 1997.13° The Act
allows couples to contract for a covenant marriage, rather than a traditional one,
and imposes both pre-marital and post-marital criteria for the couple to ful-
fill. "'3 1 Before the couple weds, they must complete three requirements set
forth in the Act. 13 2 First, they must provide full disclosure of anything "which
may adversely affect the decision to enter into this marriage." '133 Second, the
couple must receive pre-marital counseling from a religious leader or profes-
sional counselor.' 34 Finally, the couple must vow to seek marital counseling
122 See Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So. 2d 826, 829 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
123 See Rodriguez, 13 P.3d at 420.
124 See id. at 415-16. The couple was married for twenty-one years. See id.
125 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.003(11) (Vernon 2000).
126 See Woodhouse, supra note 38, at 2535-36.
127 See Biondi, supra note 7, at 619 (citing Laura Gatland, Putting the Blame on No-Fault,
83-APR A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (1997)).
128 See id.
129 See id. at 620.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 619-20.
132 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A) (West 2000).
133 Id. § 9:273(A)(1).
134 See id. § 9:273(A)(2).
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when they experience trouble in their relationship.1 35 The Act also restricts
divorce grounds to fault-based transgressions such as adultery, commission of a
felony with a sentence of death or hard labor, abandonment, physical or sexual
abuse of the spouse seeking the divorce, or of a child, and living apart.136
Proponents of fault-based dissolution statutes also argue that fault func-
tions as leverage for the economically disadvantaged spouse. 13 7 The spouse,
usually the wife, may bargain for a fair divorce settlement by threatening a trial
where her husband's misgivings will be broadcast to the public.138 In addition,
if a faultless wife demonstrates to a court that her husband was at fault, she
immediately strengthens her case and increases her chances for a greater share
of property, and a significant maintenance award. 139
Although reformers favoring fault-based legislation have the good inten-
tion of preserving the family unit, reverting to a fault-based regime is not the
answer. Fault-based proposals add unnecessary strain to the divorce process,
proving counterproductive to the parties. 140 Most significantly, these provi-
sions leave much of the statute open to interpretation, thereby broadening judi-
cial discretion.' 4 ' With no objective guidelines, a spouse's behavior is left to
the prudence of the court, virtually encouraging divorcing couples to seek the
specific courtrooms and jurisdictions that best fit their dissolution needs.' 42
Forum shopping based on the "wildly divergent standards in different court-
rooms"' 43 is a factor that greatly contributed to the advent of no-fault divorce
in the first place. Moreover, when judges are left to interpret a fault-based
statute (Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Act, for example), they have limitless
discretion in deciding what constitutes faulty behavior and to what extent that
behavior should be punished.'"
Reintroducing fault into divorce law also allows for unjust results based
on cultural assumptions, particularly about women.' 4 5 For instance, a faultless
wife who is employed outside the home may receive a smaller financial settle-
ment than her homemaker counterpart, simply because she appears to be less
victimized, or less deserving.146 In contrast, a wife who stays at home and is at
fault is entitled to nothing under the fault-based philosophy, despite her severe
economic need. 47 Her divorce would thus leave her, and most likely her chil-
dren, in poverty because her husband's duty to provide financial support would
be alleviated.' 48
135 See id.
136 See Biondi, supra note 7, at 620.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 620-21.
139 See id. at 621.
140 See id. at 611.
141 See id. at 623.
142 See id.
143 Id.
144 See id. at 625.
145 See id.
146 See id.




Advances in Tort Law
With advances in the area of tort law, alimony laws that take fault into
account become even less necessary. As the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity continues to deteriorate, victimized spouses need no longer rely on
dissolution statutes to provide remedies.149 For example, a spouse that is phys-
ically abused by his or her partner now has the ability to bring a battery
claim. 5' A spouse may also have a viable claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (lIED), arising from an incident where there was no physical
altercation, but verbal or psychological abuse.' 1 ' Critics fear that relying on
tort law will lead to additional claims, but the pressing issue is not the number
of claims, but rather, the tort law's ability to handle these claims and provide
adequate remedies. 52 Assuming it does, an abused spouse will seek redress
under the tort law and courts will no longer be required to provide a remedy at
the time of divorce. Opponents also argue that victims of spousal abuse may be
physically or psychologically unable to bring a battery claim before the statute
of limitations expires.153 Whether tort law should manage these cases differ-
ently, by tolling the statute for example, 154 is a question beyond the scope of
this Note. This proposal, however, presents a more preferable alternative to
joining the battery and dissolution claims.' 55
B. Reformation of Alimony Statutes
Without reverting back to a fault-based regime, how can alimony statutes
be reformed to create a more uniform and consistent system that satisfies the
policy concerns of state legislatures? There is no steadfast solution, but several
sensible proposals lead us in the right direction.
1. The American Law Institute
The 1998 draft of the American Law Institute's (ALl) Principles suggests
reform in all aspects of divorce law, including alimony.' 56 The ALl proposes
the elimination of need as a basis for alimony awards and its replacement with
an inquiry as to a spouse's loss after a divorce. 57 Accordingly, alimony
becomes "a remedy for unfair loss allocation, rather than for relief of need."' 58
The Principles even go so far as to replace the term "alimony" with the phrase
149 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 792.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 794. lIED claims are not as clearly defined as battery claims, often because
there is no physical touching. See id. Courts generally entertain lIED claims when accom-
panied by a battery, but pure HED claims are less successful because without a physical
attack, it is difficult to prove a defendant's outrageous behavior. See id. at 793-94.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 793.
154 See id.
"Is See id. ("Consideration [of the tort claim] under some general and highly discretionary
rubric of marital fault would merely obscure the policy issue presented by old claims, which
could still be pressed.").
156 See generally Ira Mark Ellman, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture on the Fam-
ily: Inventing Family Law, 32 U.C. DAvis L. Rev. 855 (1999).




"compensatory payments."' 5 9 The ALI draft contains explanations of five dif-
ferent losses, distinguishable primarily by the length of the relationship. ' 6 0 The
proposal works to reach a post-divorce point where the parties share the eco-
nomic loss equally. 16 1 To accomplish this task, the Principles award compen-
satory payments in proportion to the length of the marriage and the caretaking
duration. 162  Similar to child support statutes in many states, the maintenance
awards in this case are allocated in periodic payments, although the court can
order a lump sum payment as well.
163
The ALI Principles are revolutionary in that they provide for appellate
review. A spouse is entitled to an award under this format unless the trial court
judge finds that the facts of his or her case differ substantially from the majority
of cases, in a manner not contemplated by the presumption, thereby making
adherence to the Principles unjust to one of the parties. 1'" Upon appellate
review, the questions become whether the case does in fact differ substantially
from the facts of other cases, and whether an award in accordance with the
presumption would actually be unjust.' 65
More importantly, the ALI's approach reduces the vast discretion afforded
to trial judges under a fault-based system. While the size of the awards may





The two key losses are the loss of the marital living standard at the dissolution of a marriage of
significant duration, incurred by the spouse who has less wealth or earning capacity, and the loss
in earning capacity incurred during the marriage, and continuing after divorce, arising from a
spouse's disproportionate share during marriage of the responsibility to care for the couple's
children. Note also that the chapter does not recognize these two losses on an all or nothing
basis, but in proportion to the length of the marriage or child care period. The loss of marital
living standard, for example, is fully recognized only in relatively lengthy marriages. Note also
that the chapter does not call for full compensation for the loss even then, but rather equal
sharing of the loss by the uninjured party. The Principles find no basis for shifting an entire loss
from one party to the other within the context of a no-fault system ... The third recognized loss
is modeled on the loss incurred on account of the spouse's care of "a sick, elderly or disabled
third party, in fulfillment of a moral obligation of the other spouse or both spouses jointly." The
two remaining recognized losses do not depend upon duration for their full recognition, and thus
can have importance in shorter marriages. They are "[t]he loss either spouse incurs when the
marriage is dissolved before that spouse realizes a fair return from his or her investment in the
other spouse's earning capacity," and "[an unfairly disproportionate disparity between the
spouses in their respective abilities to recover their pre-marital living standard after the dissolu-
tion of a short marriage."
Id. at 879-80 n.54.
161 See id. at 881.
162 See id.
163 See id.
16 See id. at 881-82.




2. The Income-Sharing Model
Jana B. Singer's proposal for alimony reform rests in her income-sharing
model.167 Under this theory, the spouses, as equal contributors to the marriage,
should share equally any benefit or loss resulting from their divorce. 168 The
key to Singer's approach is that the incomes of the parties after divorce remain
jointly, rather than individually, owned.'6 9 In a marriage of long duration, for
example, this method would work to allow divorced spouses to share their
income for a specific number of years, possibly one year for every two years of
marriage. 170
The effects of this proposal are very encouraging. For instance, a spouse
with an earning capacity much more significant than that of his or her spouse is
no longer able to threaten that spouse with "economic abandonment" when the
marriage ends. 171 In addition, Singer argues that this method persuades men to
increase their participation in domestic life. 172 This not only benefits the chil-
dren, but initiates gender equality in the workplace, a change. 173 Like the ALI
model, the income sharing approach is also effective in eliminating judicial
discretion with respect to alimony awards by reducing the vague standards
often associated with a fault-based regime. 1
74
3. A Middle-Ground Approach
While the aforementioned proposals offer refreshing suggestions for ali-
mony reform, state legislatures do not yet seem ready to abandon their fault-
based philosophies in favor of a no-fault regime, especially one that eliminates
need-based alimony, or one that requires shared income even after the end of
the relationship. Perhaps a middle ground approach, incorporating provisions
from both no-fault and fault-based statutes, would meet the need for uniformity
and consistency while still appeasing proponents on each side of the debate.
An acceptable statutory scheme would restrict a court's consideration of
fault without necessarily eliminating it altogether. First, the statute must articu-
late the exact behavior that constitutes fault. Simply stating that marital mis-
conduct is an appropriate ground for denying alimony is unacceptable because
it allows for immeasurable judicial discretion, with varied and inconsistent
results. 175
Second, the middle ground statute would not look at fault to determine
whether a maintenance award is justified, but rather to adjudicate the size and
duration of the award. Even then, the consideration of fault would be coupled
167 See Jana B. Singer, Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory: Alimony and
Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82
GEO. L.J. 2423, 2454 (1994).
168 See id. at 2455.
169 See id.
170 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 636.
171 See Singer, supra note 167, at 2455.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 2456.
175 See Ellman, supra note 42, at 784.
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with an evaluation of each spouse's need for alimony.' 7 6 This is consistent
with the policies underlying no-fault divorce in that the actual grounds for end-
ing the marriage remain fault-free. 177 Marital misconduct would be used
merely as one of many factors to gauge how much a spouse is entitled to and
for how long. This would serve an especially important function in jurisdic-
tions where, after the adoption of no-fault grounds for dissolution, the legisla-
tive histories remain silent as to the role of fault in property division and
alimony.17
The idea of a statute that affects only the size and duration of an alimony
award is present in Texas's maintenance provision, 179 yet the law remains
problematic because this element is combined with two other stipulations.
When applied as a whole, the statute proves severely restricted, making compli-
ance by the spouse seeking support nearly impossible. For instance, the second
element in Texas's statute requires that the couple be married for ten years
before a party can request alimony. 8° This provision forces courts to reject
legitimate claims for support simply because the relationship did not last a dec-
ade. One envisions a deserving spouse being denied maintenance simply
because his or her marriage ended after nine years and six months.
The third Texas provision limits alimony awards to a term of no longer
than three years.' 8 ' Short-term, or rehabilitative, maintenance developed after
the introduction of no-fault legislation, and aimed to provide temporary support
to wives until they could supplement their education and become self-sufficient
in the workforce.18' This type of award presents serious problems, however,
because it fails to consider the significant difference in the earning potentials
for men and women.183 Even after a wife takes the time to further her educa-
tion and training, she remains unable to secure a salary comparable to her male
counterpart.' 84 Moreover, statutes similar to that in Texas are detrimental to
176 A separate evaluation, using the same format, would be done to determine the distribu-
tion of community property.
177 See id. at 776.
178 See, e.g., Huggins v. Huggins, 331 So. 2d 704 (Ala. 1976) (reading fault into alimony
statute regardless of grounds for divorce); Peterson v. Peterson, 242 N.W.2d 103 (Minn.
1976) (noting that no-fault grounds are limited to divorce and do not extend to property or
alimony); Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975) (stating that no-fault grounds for
divorce are not controlling on the issue of alimony); Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.
App. 1977) (finding no provision regarding the role of fault in property division that corre-
sponded with the no-fault grounds for ending the marriage); Heilman v. Heilman, 610 So. 2d
60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing to consider adultery as a factor in awarding alimony);
Anderson v. Anderson, 230 S.E.2d 272 (Ga. 1976) (reasoning that since no-fault grounds
precluded a finding that fault caused the breakdown of the marriage, evidence on the fault of
a spouse would also be irrelevant on the issue of alimony); Marriage of Williams, 199
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (eliminating "guilty party" concept from alimony determinations to
satisfy the legislature's intent); Campbell v. Campbell, 276 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1979) (hold-
ing that the issue of whether one party was responsible for the breakdown of the marriage
was not a proper factor for the court to consider when dividing property).
1'9 See TEx. Fm. CODE ANN. § 8.002(2) (Vernon 2000).
180 See id.
s' See id. § (a)(]).





homemakers and wives that have just ended lengthy marriages, because their
age, combined with the amount of time spent outside of the labor market,
increase their need for financial assistance beyond the point where rehabilita-
tive maintenance is beneficial.
185
Community property states are presented with another alternative for
keeping their property distribution statutes aligned with their alimony statutes.
By dividing community property equally instead of equitably, state legislatures
successfully eradicate the consideration of fault.1 86 Legislatures could base ali-
mony statutes on the same presumption of equality, eliminating the role of fault
and enabling the use of another scheme, such as the ALl Principles, to balance
the equities between the parties. This approach would eliminate, at least in
part, the discretion of divorce courts, and may even encourage couples to settle
amicably, sparing them the cost, publicity, and emotional turmoil associated
with a trial.
Of course, couples always have the option of entering into pre-nuptual
agreements to avoid the current statutory schemes in their states. Valid agree-
ments allow the parties to indicate in writing their desires should their marriage
terminate and, unless they violate public policy, the contracts trump the statu-
tory requirements. This allows parties to take into account their earning capaci-
ties and assets, and encourages them to "create their own incentives, whether
financial or otherwise, to stay in the marriage." 187
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that current dissolution laws, statutes regarding spousal
support in particular, are in desperate need of reform. The advent of no-fault
divorce resulted in no-fault provisions in all fifty states, but it did not resolve
the question of whether fault should continue to play a role in property alloca-
tion and alimony awards.' 8 8 States are divided on this issue, and some reform-
ers suggest that the most efficient way to solve the problem is to reintroduce
fault-based criteria into dissolution laws.' 89 However, this solution only exac-
185 See id. at 616-17.
186 See BLUMBERG, supra note 70, at 6. California, Louisiana, and New Mexico are all
equal division jurisdictions. See id. Nevada is also an equal distribution state, but the rele-
vant statute goes one step further, allowing for an unequal division of community property
when the court finds a compelling reason. See NEV. REv. STAT. 125.150(l)(b) (1993).
187 Bradford, supra note 1, at 636. Historically, premarital agreements addressing spousal
support and property division upon divorce were deemed unenforceable for several reasons.
It was believed that the agreements were against public policy because they encouraged
divorce, that alimony was a state-imposed obligation and thus not subject to private contract,
and that enforcement of such agreements would result in the disadvantaged spouse relying
indefinitely on public assistance. See Nora J. Lauerman, Feminist Moral, Social, and Legal
Theory: A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Mar-
riage and at Divorce, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 511-12 (1987). The current trend, however, is
to uphold valid antenuptial agreements defining support and property rights, provided the
agreement was entered into in good faith, and there was full and fair disclosure of the nature
and extent of each spouse's assets. See id. at 513 (citing Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381
(Fla. 1970)).




erbates the problem because fault-based laws allow for limitless judicial discre-
tion, and needs a variety of statutory interpretations, often overlooking the
parties' abilities to pay.
Nevada is one of several states that forbid consideration of fault in all
aspects of dissolution law.1 90 The Rodriguez case demonstrates the importance
of a no-fault approach to alimony awards, and an application of the facts to
fault-based provisions in other community property states illustrates the finan-
cial disaster facing a faulty spouse under a fault-based regime.
Several viable alternatives have been suggested that will determine main-
tenance awards without reference to marital misconduct. Most state legisla-
tures, however, seem somewhat hesitant to discard their fault-based provisions
entirely. Tension between proponents on both sides of this issue may be eased
with the adoption of statutes that incorporate workable provisions from both
fault-based and no-fault policies. This would address the two most common
concerns with current laws: inconsistent application and vast judicial discre-
tion.191 If nothing else, this statutory scheme indicates to state legislatures that
marriage is much more than a status relationship.19 2 Expanding notions of
partnership and family are constantly redefining marriage, and legislatures
should structure divorce laws in a manner that encourages individual choices,
rather than dictates family values. 19 3
190 See id. at 813-14.
191 See id. at 784.
192 See Bradford, supra note 1, at 636.
193 See id.
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